In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Dutch and British private corporations were accused of having aided and abetted in the violation of the human rights of individuals in Nigeria. A lawsuit, however, was brought in the United States, relying on the Alien Tort Statute-part of a Judiciary Act from 1789. In its final decision on the case, the US Supreme Court has strongly focused on 'territory.' This usage of a spatial category calls for closer scrutiny of how the making of legal arguments presupposes 'spatial knowledge,' especially in the field of transnational human rights litigation. Space is hardly a neutral category. What is at stake is normativity in a global scale with the domestic courtroom turned into a site of spatial contestation. The paper is interested in the construction of 'the transnational' as space, which implicates a 'politics of space' at work underneath the exposed surface of legal argumentation. The 'Kiobel situation' as it unfolded before the Supreme Court is addressed as example of a broader picture including a variety of contested elements of space: a particular spatial condition of modern nation-state territoriality; the production of 'counter-space,' eventually undermining the spatial regime of inter-state society; and the state not accepting its withering away. The paper will ask: How are normative boundaries between the involved jurisdictional spaces drawn? How do the 'politics of space' work underneath or beyond the plain moments of judicial decision-making? How territorialized is the legal knowledge at work and how does territoriality work in legal arguments? Theory, vol. 5, no.1 (2014) Abstract: In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Dutch and British private corporations were accused of having aided and abetted in the violation of the human rights of individuals in Nigeria. A lawsuit, however,
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On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States. And even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.
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The logic of government is the logic of jurisdiction-question it and all that is solid melts into air. with sufficient force'. 5 The previous judgment of the Court of Appeals of the 2 nd Circuit 6 that had rejected the case in 2010 was thus affirmed.
In this paper I assume that space is not a neutral category, not an objective fact. The making of any legal arguments presupposes a spatial knowledge that had become a critical matter of controversy in the field of transnational human rights litigation. What is at stake is 4 Kiobel. 5 Kiobel, p. 14. of an international regime of territoriality. Second, the challenge of transnational litigation could be taken for granted, e.g. as a now given phenomenon of globalization that the world of nation-states would have to cope with. The major concern would then be on normative order in the global realm. The question would be what normative changes may be caused or how a normative order touched by phenomena of transnational human rights litigation would look like. The assumption in this paper, however, is that these two views can hardly be separated.
Both views relate to each other in highly productive ways; and I argue that 'the political' comes in with this inter-relatedness. The aim is thus to extrapolate the social productivity of the very relation between taken-for-granted territoriality and taken-for-granted phenomena of globalization.
Following a now remarkable body of work emphasizing the spatiality of state, substate, and non-state politics, 17 such phenomena of contested normativity as contested spaceand I see transnational litigation as one such phenomenon-can hardly be understood as operating against the background of an eternally fixed and externally given regime of territoriality. Rather, the meaning of territory or space turns into a matter of controversy.
Following insights inspired by critical geography, 18 space and territoriality cannot be treated as given but must be understood as contingent, i.e. as result of a history of territorial fixes, further an alternative body of spatial knowledge. A major concern of this paper is thus to establish a research framework for analyzing the production of transnational law's space.
Before this argument can be unfolded it is necessary to elaborate the nexus between territory and law or the spatial moment of jurisdiction, respectively. What is coming to the fore in this passage is that the mentioned 'global administrative space'-as now being 'recognized'-is in need of regulation, that is, a particular kind of regulation which emancipates itself from the nation-state constitutional bonds though taking up impulses from 'administrative law.' But we should be aware that this is a normative argument since the GAL approach takes for granted that regulatory space-including its particular needs of being governed-is already there. What is neglected is that the practice of (global) administration, in turn, also affects (or even creates) space. GAL already implicates a certain normative order which is axiomatically set beyond the approach's theoretical reflection. GAL, in other words, lacks a theoretical account on power, i.e. a theory of how space comes into being by way of everyday politico-legal practice. In so doing, the approach is by no means less 'normative' than the constitutionalist accounts criticized by GAL as too wide-ranging in a normative sense. 59 however, would be to say that building community would mean to create space, i.e. the construction of community and the production of space will always go hand in hand.
The notion of a constructed community alone cannot provide satisfying answers to how law and space are interrelated. highly political because as practice it immediately affects the knowledge-power nexus and contributes to generating a régime du savoir. 63 To take this 'political moment' of spatial knowledge into account a framework of analysis must remain open for discursive interventions putting transnational law in charge as means for whatever ends. In principle, this could include both, spatial resistance as well as a perpetuation of the established 'state mode of production'. 64 Transnational law is to be understood as a technique of spatial production, 65 and is thus deeply involved in a politics of space.
This is the broader frame in which this paper seeks to analyze the production of space in the course of transnational human rights litigation. If the 'domestic' courtroom becomes (or: is transformed into) a site where the production of space is 'negotiated' by means of transnational law, the dense and historically congealed link between territoriality and jurisdiction 66 and thus the established demarcations between national and international affairs, as well as, between public and private forms of governance 67 are made subject to highly contested legal knowledge practice.
In this respect, the aim is to put the phenomenon of transnational human rights 
LITTLE LITIGATION NOTHINGS
The recent Supreme Court decision on Kiobel significantly cuts future possibilities to sue human rights violators before US courts, particularly when the relevant conduct occurred on the territory of a foreign sovereign. While human rights advocates criticize the decision as disappointing, 71 those speaking in the name of private business hail the judicial strengthening of the state. 72 In fact, the decision points to an exclusion of private conduct beyond the jurisdictional boundaries of the Unites States from being adjudicated through US courts, even when massive violations of human rights are at issue. But at the same time this exclusion is achieved only by way of a perpetuation of nation-state boundaries: transnational private governance goes hand-in-hand with 'modern'-perhaps 'post-modern'-nation-state practice.
Although the decision on Kiobel can be understood as a moment of juridico-political 'gravity', the mentioned spatial issues are somehow 'subliminal,' i.e. not present on the surface of legal argumentation. A mainly 'legal' analysis of the decision, however, risks veiling the micro-politics at work in everyday legal knowledge practices. While true, territoriality was weighted remarkably high in the Supreme Court's Kiobel decision, debate is rather focusing on future possibilities of litigation, not the spatial repercussions of the case. 73 But it is this latter moment that interests me from a social science perspective. It is this latter perspective on global normativity that puts the 'workings of geographies of knowledge' 74 on the agendas of an empirical engagement with transnational law. The (global) regulation of world society operates in a variety of (local) sites-a 'good part of globalization consists of an enormous variety of subnational micro-processes' 75 -with the domestic courtroom as one of these sites.
In sum, the underlying idea is to analyze Kiobel with respect to how territoriality and space are constructed, i.e. whether and how taken positions are built upon bodies of territorialized knowledge and how these positions, in turn, contribute to the regime of space.
To this end, Kiobel is deployed analytically as the site to observe a legal politics of space at work. Being inspired by Jef Huysmans' concept of 'little security nothings,' I switch the focus to little litigation nothings-'devices, sites, practices without exceptional significance'. 76 In so doing, I also follow a stream of 'ethnographic' work on inter-or transnational relations as outlined, inter alia, in early feminist studies in IR (in the late 1980s). 77 Culminating in the slogan that 'the personal is international', 78 Cynthia Enloe argues that 'we can acquire a more realistic understanding of how international politics actually "works"' 79 by analyzing politics beyond the visible international situations like international meetings of the (mostly male) heads of states.
While Kiobel is considered a landmark decision, exceptional in a way, the territorial patterns at work are not the exposed matter of attention. The little litigation nothings, it is now argued, do the reproductive work on the meaning of jurisdictional space and/ or the spatial knowledge of law, respectively. The core analytical assumption is that legal arguments, though not necessarily intended to reproduce social space, tend to take on a life of their own.
It is thus not the substance of a legal argument but the way how these arguments are used as a But piracy stayed an issue, even after the court had switched the focus to territoriality-perhaps even as a hidden ('invisibilized') Achilles' heel in the court majority's opinion. The reason for this is that piracy, no doubt, has an extraterritorial dimension. While it seems to be established that pirates would be liable under the ATS and, at the same time, the extraterritorial dimension of piracy is taken for granted, it is eventually inconsistent to say that the ATS has no extraterritorial reach. Acknowledging the right under international law to seize pirates in whatever place may not be compatible with saying that nothing in the ATS would rebut the extraterritorial presumption.
Applying U. S. law to pirates, however, does not typically impose the sovereign will of the United States onto conduct occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of another sovereign […] . Pirates […] generally did not operate within any jurisdiction.
[…] We do not think that the existence of a cause of action against them is a sufficient basis for concluding that other causes of action under the ATS reach conduct that does occur within the territory of another sovereign; pirates may well be a category unto themselves.
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In fact, pirates are made a 'category unto themselves' within this passage by being located somewhere beyond territorial jurisdiction, i.e. in a non-space. Piracy is deterritorialized. That productive determination, however, is hardly without any alternative.
'The majority,' as Justice Breyer puts it, cannot wish this piracy example away by emphasizing that piracy takes place on the high seas […] . That is because the robbery and murder that make up piracy do not normally take place in the water; they take place on a ship. And a ship is like land, in that it falls within the jurisdiction of the nation whose flag it flies.
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And that would of course, as Breyer continues, 'typically involve applying our law to acts taking place within the jurisdiction of another sovereign.' 96 The issue at stake is, in other words, how to locate piracy in a normative space. Piracy is spatially signified and thus ascribed with a certain spatial meaning that, in turn, generates an Achilles' heel of the legal argument. The majority's construction of piracy while operating in a normative non-space 94 Kiobel, 10-11. 95 Breyer, p. 4. 96 ibid., p. 4-5.
contributes to the plausibility of the whole spatial story that is put forward with the decision.
Since pirates are granted a certain position in the record of ATS jurisprudence, locating their activity on another sovereign's territory would undermine the 'extraterritorial presumption' argument. In sum, piracy is not a mere sideshow. The spatial construction of piracy as a 'category unto themselves' rather contributes to a productive spatial narrative and is thus brought up as a decisive tool in the rejection of the case.
As a result, the Kiobel decision curtails the scope for future human rights suits against transnational private corporations remarkably. The role which the underlying spatial knowledge plays becomes highly obvious in the last passages of the opinion. In the text, limits to future lawsuits against corporations are particularly established through an emphasis on the relation between corporative conduct and the territory of the United States.
And even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application […] . Corporations are often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices.
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With regard to the future scope of legal possibilities one could raise the argument that the court has left things in the dark. 98 The 'touch and concern' formula is setting a fluid criterion. While the mere corporate presence on US territory is now said to be an insufficient relation, this would not per se preclude creative constructions of inter-relations between space and conduct in the future. 99 From a social science point of view-and particularly with regard to the theoretical argument on the production of space-the problem is more fundamental and . The majority framed the question presented in these terms no fewer than three times; it repeated the same language, focusing solely on the location of the relevant "conduct" or "violation," at least eight more times in other parts of its eight-page opinion; and it affirmed our judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' claims because "all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States," […] . Lower courts are bound by that rule and they are without authority to "reinterpret" the Court's binding precedent in light of irrelevant factual distinctions, such as the citizenship of the defendants.' [citations and footnotes omitted]).
grounds in a problematic spatial circularity of the discussed legal decision. Although deeply involved in the production of space, the court presents territory as physically given. Territory is thus 'naturalized' and, in so doing, a veil is drawn over the political nature of social space.
The court works with the very notion of territory and space which is so fundamentally questioned by the literature in the field of critical geography and beyond. In sum, if we assume that territory is constructed and that legal text like a decision of the US Supreme
Courts participates in an ongoing process of the production of space, the 'touch and concern' formula appears in a different light.
CONCLUSION
In this paper I have argued that transnational human rights litigation may cut through the heart of a territorialized legal knowledge. In order to establish a framework for the critical analysis of human rights litigation, territory and space have been understood as not physically given but as constructed in an ongoing social and socio-legal process. Legal practice like in
Kiobel makes sense only against the background of a particular spatial knowledge.
'Transnational' jurisprudence is affected because, in the first place, legal practice will have to make sense of 'the transnational.' Put differently, 'the transnational' will have to be constructed as a space within which a certain legal practice makes sense. Since the established construction of territory has such critical repercussions on how legal arguments can be developed, territoriality turns into a legal technology.
Where the congealed notion of territorial jurisdiction is questioned, the solid ground of historically congealed governance structures 'melts into air'. 100 By borrowing from Marx' and Engels' Manifesto Ford nicely points out how much is at stake where space become a matter of controversy, even where the spatial moment of controversy is not made too explicit. In this paper, Kiobel has been understood as a critical site of such contestation. When facing such a
